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In a recent EUROPP article, Cathrine Holst presented an argument in favour of ‘epistocracy’,
or expert rule. Tom Angier  writes that while arguments for expert rule can be traced as far
back as Ancient Greece, a modern conception of epistocracy is doomed to be either ‘banal
or dangerous’. He argues that we should resist the temptation to trade democracy for
expertise.
Greece: the birthplace of  democracy. True or f alse? Well, true in a sense. Since the
f inancial crisis, the Greek people have rediscovered their polit ical voice, a voice f irst
heard – albeit less shrilly, and on a f ar smaller scale – in the ancient Athenian polis, or city-state. Ancient
Greece was, indeed, the f irst major democratic power, even if  those qualif ied to vote and participate in
polit ical debate were relatively f ew (namely, cit izen males of  a certain age). When it comes to polit ical
philosophy, however, Greece is the birthplace of  radically anti-democratic thought. Plato and Aristotle
have bequeathed us moral and polit ical theories that are overwhelmingly suspicious of  vox populi. Why
so?
In Plato’s case, he had seen the Athenian democratic State
execute his great teacher, Socrates, while Aristotle, as tutor of
Alexander the Great, was closer to those wielding imperial
power than to the dēmos. But besides these biographical
motivations, both philosophers were wedded to a paradigm of
polit ical decision-making that excludes, or at least thoroughly
sidelines the people: namely, polit ical expertise. The Greek
word f or expertise is technē, so it is no surprise that a major
rival to democracy (the rule of  the people) is technocracy (the
rule of  the experts). Plato ascribes politikē technē, or polit ical
expertise, to his philosopher-kings, and it is this that
supposedly qualif ies them to rule over the people. They are
presented as knowing both what is in the people’s interests,
and how to achieve this, better than the people themselves.
Platonism, or something approaching it, has recently made a
come-back in polit ical theory. Going under the name of
‘epistocracy’, or the rule of  the knowers – Plato tends to use
epistēmē (knowledge) interchangeably with technē – the idea is that, at least under ‘modern’ conditions,
experts should have a f ar greater say in polit ical decision-making than the canons of  democratic polit ical
theory allow. As Cathrine Holst of  the EPISTO Project puts it, a more epistocratic or expert- led polit ics
holds out the prospect of  ‘resolute and knowledge-based decision-making’, embodying ‘procedures that
optimise ef f iciency and rationality’, thereby enabling societies to ‘deal with the new risks and hazards’ of
a globalised world. This prospect no doubt has its attractions, attractions that have, as I’ve indicated, an
ancient pedigree. Let me elaborate on this f urther.
Plato’s basic claim is that the dēmos is unreliable. Although it may hit, occasionally, on the right policies,
this is f undamentally a matter of  luck, and any belief  that is true by accident cannot be knowledge. The
only epistemically respectable posit ion, then, is that of  the technitēs, the expert or man of  skill, who has
a f irm grasp of  the rules and norms governing a particular area of  enquiry and practice. To take some
examples: the shoe-maker, ship-builder, doctor or general is master over his own domain, delivering not
only the right answers, but also the right outcomes. And the expert who gains Plato’s greatest respect –
bar the advent of  the philosopher-king – is the mathematician, who deals with the most stable, most
certain, and most generally applicable knowledge there is.
Such technē-knowledge lays the groundwork f or today’s epistocratic hopes. It sets the standard f or
what Holst calls ‘the most rational outcomes’, instantiating the kind of  ‘decision quality’ and ‘f ine-grained
… analyses’ she suggests should inf orm the polit ical sphere. Environmental experts healing the earth,
health experts curing our bodies, terrorism experts securing our borders, and economics experts sorting
out our cash-f low problems: on the basis of  such expertise, we would not only maximise our chances of
getting the benef its we seek, the costs of  intractable democratic disagreement would, in all likelihood, be
circumvented. As Plato speculates, if  moral and polit ical debate were subject to the kind of  decision-
procedures seen optimally in mathematics, we ‘would proceed to count and soon resolve our dif f erence’.
This vision of  democratic polit ics ceding ground to expertise is either banal, or dangerous. On the one
hand, if  those in f avour of  a more epistocratic State want polit icians to (at least) consult or (at most)
def er to experts, they are peddling banalit ies – f or both happen already. Polit icians cannot master the
multiple f orms of  expertise relevant to even a single section of  one government department. But more
crucially, there are signif icant disagreements between experts even within limited domains of  expertise,
and these disagreements are of ten themselves f undamentally polit ical. So to appeal to ‘the experts’ as if
this would yield univocal, or (per impossibile) polit ically neutral results, is naïve. The rule of  experts would
generate not expert rule, but a cacophony of  conf licting views and interests.
On the other hand, if  the epistocratic argument is that polit ics itself  constitutes an expertise, this is
dangerous. Plutarch, f or one, denies the danger, decrying as ‘ridiculous’ those who require that the
oarsman be qualif ied, but let ‘guide the helm he … who was never taught’. But crit ics of  technocracy are
not ridiculous. They recognise that the ‘skill’ of  the polit ician is, at best, a hodge-podge of  dif f erent
aptitudes. Psychological acuity, rhetorical panache, some historical knowledge, the ability to compromise,
but also a certain ruthlessness: all go to make up the good polit ician. Above all, however, the good
polit ician must be devoted to the people he or she represents – and it is this democratic, people-centric
commitment that makes the assimilation of  polit ics to a technē inevitably misleading. Why so? There are
at least two reasons.
First, as Aristotle realised (unlike Plato), human beings introduce a host of  complexit ies into any
proposed course of  action, since they have manif old needs that dif f er over t ime and space. This holds
f ar more at the polit ical level than f or more circumscribed and less people-centric craf ts (e.g. chess),
where the variables are f ewer. Secondly, technē or expertise consists essentially, as Aristotle also
realised, in knowledge of  various means-end techniques. It f ollows that it stands in need, always and
necessarily, of  being moulded in an ethical direction. So when those sympathetic to epistocracy
recommend that polit icians deploy expertise to save the environment, contain terror, sort out the
economy, etc., they gloss over the f act that these are matters of  deep ethical controversy to begin with,
which technocratic prof iciency per se has no power to decide.
If  the dilemma I’ve set out is accurate, and the epistocrat’s counsel is either banal or dangerously
unrealistic, it does not f ollow that democracy itself  is lacking in dangers. Indeed, democracy is
dangerous, as Michael Mann’s The Dark Side of Democracy, and the slide to the right in countries like the
Netherlands points to. But it is less dangerous than its rivals – even than Holst’s ‘democratic
epistocracy’, which (implausibly and somewhat sinisterly) trumpets its ‘basic, but minimal democratic
standards’. For the great virtue of  genuine democracy lies in recognising that, as Hegel puts it, ‘we do
not need to be … prof essionals to acquire knowledge of  matters of  universal interest’. It f ollows that if
any ‘prof essionals’ set themselves up as experts in matters of  universal, polit ical interest, the dēmos and
its representatives should not hesitate to put them f irmly in their place.
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